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INTRODUCTION 
This is a land use case in which the plaintiffs/appellees (collectively referred to herein 
as the "Bradleys"), challenge the exercise of legislative discretion by the Payson City Council 
in denying two applications for rezoning of their property. 
Between the filing of Payson City's initial brief in this case and the brief of Bradleys, 
this Court issued its opinion in Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City. 2000 Utah Ct. App. 31, 
997 P.2d 321 in which it addressed and rejected arguments which are virtually identical to 
those being advanced by the Bradleys here. The Court carefully evaluated the legal issues in 
Harmon City and concluded that the standard of review which is applicable to the exercise 
of legislative discretion by municipal officials in making land use and zoning decisions 
affords the governing body broad judicial deference and a strong presumption of validity. 
Such a legislative decision should be upheld if it is fairly or reasonably debatable whether 
the decision is in the interest of the general welfare of the community. Under the principles 
of stare decisis^ Harmon City controls here and this Court should apply that same 
deferential, reasonably debatable standard to reverse the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment to Bradleys in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE "REASONABLY DEBATABLE35 STANDARD AND BROAD 
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE APPLY TO THE CITY'S LEGISLATIVE 
ZONING DECISION AND THE TRIAL COURTS USE OF THE 
"SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE35 STANDARD IS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Bradleys ignore the long-standing judicial tradition of affording municipal legislative 
actions, including zoning decisions, substantial deference. They argue instead that the 
appropriate review of these legislative decisions is the substantial evidence standard which 
has historically been applied only to municipal administrative and quasi-judicial decisions. 
In support of this standard, Bradleys argue that (1) the legislature created a ccone-size-fits-all 
standard of review" for municipal land use decisions; and (2) the Supreme Court in 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 
332 contemplated applying the substantial evidence standard to legislative zoning decisions. 
This Court, however, carefully and thoroughly addressed both arguments in Harmon City 
and rejected them. 
In Harmon City, the Court reviewed the extensive case law discussed by Payson City 
in its Appellant's Brief of judicial review of land use decisions. 
Judicial review of land use decisions by municipalities has always been 
limited in this state to some formulation of the arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal standard. However, the deference that we have historically 
granted to land use decisions under this standard has varied depending 
on whether the decision-making body is acting in a legislative capacity 
or an administrative/adjudicative capacity. 
Harmon City at 11 8 (footnotes omitted). Analyzing this history, the Court rejected the 
argument that the legislature intended to end this judicial deference to legislative land use 
decisions. 
We conclude that the 1991 enactment of section 10-9-1001(3), which 
largely codifies the case law cited above, did not alter the deferential 
review of a municipality's legislative zoning classification decisions 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
We conclude that the Utah Legislature did not adopt a one-size-fits-all 
standard of review for legislative and administrative/adjudicative 
2 
functions when it codified the "arbitrary, capricious, or illegal" 
language of section 10-9-1001. 
Id. at 111114,15 (citations omitted, emphasis added). In other words, the appropriate 
standard of review of a municipal legislative zoning decision affords Payson City's denial of 
Bradleys' rezoning request broad judicial deference and a strong presumption of validity. 
Under that standard, a zoning decision is upheld "if it could promote the general 
welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare." 
Id. at 11 9, citing Marshall v. Salt Lake City. 141 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1943). A court may 
not substitute its judgment for that of local legislators where it is at least reasonably 
debatable whether the zoning decision is in the interest of the general welfare of the 
community. Because the trial court crossed the line separating the judicial from the 
legislative branches of government and deviated from this well-established Utah legal 
precedent in granting summary judgment to Bradleys, that decision must be reversed. 
Bradleys also argue that the Supreme Court in Springville Citizens gave a "clear 
command" to apply the substantial evidence standard to legislative land use decisions. The 
Harmon City court, however, concluded that the issues in Springville Citizens were "less 
than clear" and the case should be read as consistent with the well-established case law 
granting deference to legislative decisions. 
We do admit that Springville Citizens can reasonably be read otherwise. 
However, we conclude that, because the nature of the claim in 
Springville Citizens is less than clear, we should read Springville 
Citizens' application of the standard of review as consistent with 
longstanding Utah common law and as supported by good public 
policy, rather than as a dramatic break from prior precedent where no 
such intention is expressed in the opinion. 
Harmon City at 1123, n. 14 (emphasis added). After a careful analysis of Springville 
Citizens, this Court concluded that neither § 10-9-1001(3) nor the Supreme Court ruling 
in Springville Citizens supports the application of the substantial evidence standard to 
municipal legislative zoning decisions. Harmon City at 1121. 
Because the trial court relied upon the substantial evidence standard, its decision is 
fundamentally flawed and its summary judgment should be reversed. 
H. THE CITY'S REJECTION OF BRADLEYS3 REZONING REQUEST 
PROPERLY INVOLVED A WEIGHING OF INTERESTS AND 
RESULTED IN A DECISION IN FURTHERANCE OF THE INTEREST 
OF THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY. 
Bradleys3 argument that the trial court properly found the City's decision to be 
arbitrary and capricious because it was based solely on public clamor and lacked other 
factual bases ignores several important points related to the legislative zoning process and 
the evidence in the record. To begin with, this Court has determined that "the public 
clamor doctrine has no application when a legislative body acts in a legislative capacity.35 
Harmon City at 1127 (emphasis added).1 The Court did not indicate that the public clamor 
doctrine may be a consideration under the facts of a particular case, as argued by Bradleys. 
Instead, it unequivocally stated that the doctrine has no application in the legislative 
decision-making process, in recognition of the inherently political and subjective nature of 
1While Bradleys feel that this conclusion "is indeed dubious," this Court had no 
problem concluding that the public clamor doctrine is applicable only to the 
administrative/adjudicative processes. 
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the process in making zoning decisions that deal with issues such as "compatibility" with 
neighboring properties. 
It is important to keep in mind that local legislators are elected to represent the 
interests of an entire community. Legislating itself is a political act subject to political 
considerations. See Harmon City at 11 9 n. 6 (cc[T]he legislative process is inherently 
political in nature and requires a legislative body to broadly weigh the interests of all 
concerned in furtherance of the general welfare.")2 It is appropriate for the legislative body 
to give substantial weight to the concerns of citizens with respect to the type and direction 
of the community's growth. If Bradleys do not agree with that legislative outcome, their 
remedy is political in nature—elect new local legislators who agree with them—not judicial. 
Bradleys argue that there is no evidence to support the conclusion that the City's 
decision to reject their rezoning request was not arbitrary or capricious or that it was even 
reasonably debatable. They fail to recognize and the trial court overlooked the fact that the 
rezoning request was not consistent with the City's General Plan. As more fully discussed 
in the City's initial brief, the Payson City General Plan encourages the adoption of an 
industrial zoning designation west of 1-15 and concentrating such zoning in the natural 
commercial corridor between the Union Pacific and D&RW Railroad lines and between 
interstate exits numbers 254 and 252. The plan further encourages residential areas to 
2See also Daniel R. Mandelker, et al., Federal Land Use Law § 2.03[3] (1997) ("The 
act of legislating necessarily entails political trading, compromise, and ad hoc decision 
making which, in the aggregate, produce policies that at least approximate a fair and 
equitable distribution of social resources and obligations.35 (Citation omitted.)). 
locate east of that natural 1-15 buffer (R. 50, 52). While the trial court recognized this as 
one of the bases for the City's denial of Bradleys3 request, it gave no weight to that fact. 
The General Plan, however, represents the carefully considered legislative conclusion 
of the City's governing body establishing the policies, goals and objectives for managing 
future growth. This legislatively adopted plan may not be simply disregarded in evaluating 
a rezoning request. Ironically, had the City approved Bradleys3 request in contravention of 
the General Plan, it would have been subject to a claim for acting in an arbitrary and 
capricious fashion. The legislative decision not to deviate from the City's long-term plan is 
a reasonable exercise of legislative discretion with which the courts should not interfere. 
Bradleys3 reliance on case law from other jurisdictions is misplaced. First, there is a 
well-established line of Utah case law on these issues in support of the City's decision. 
There is no need to look elsewhere. In addition, the cases referred to from other 
jurisdictions, moreover, are clearly distinguishable from Utah law. Illustratively, Kanfer v. 
Montgomery County Council 373 A.2d 5 (Md. App. 1977), for example, really applies a 
substantial evidence standard, albeit under the guise of the ccfairly debatable" rule. Kanfer at 
12. Similarly, Hall v. Korth. 244 So.2d 766, 768 (Fla.App. 1977) also required substantial 
evidence in the record. 
Utah law, by contrast, rejects the substantial evidence standard as applicable to 
judicial review of local legislative decisions. So long as there is evidence in the record to 
support the legislative action, such decisions must be affirmed under Utah law. The record 
here establishes that the legislatively enacted general plan was not consistent with the 
6 
R-2-75 rezoning requested by Bradleys. The record also establishes legitimate public 
concern that the general plan be adhered to. The legislative decision to comply with the 
legislatively created general plan is reasonable as a matter of law. 
It is important to keep in mind that merely because the circumstances and 
information surrounding the City's decision may have also justified a contrary result or a 
possible alternative conclusion, that does not render the City's decision arbitrary or 
capricious or justify a request that the trial court or this Court substitute its judgment for 
that of local decision makers. E.g., Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 252-
53 (Utah App. 1998) (city's choice of solutions for its problems is entirely within its 
discretion); Gayland v. Salt Lake County. 358 P.2d 633, 636 (Utah 1961) (same). It is 
also important to remember that the City's decision is afforded a statutory presumption of 
validity and the burden is upon Bradleys to overcome that presumption. Their evidence to 
the trial court and their arguments before this Court fail to meet that considerable threshold 
burden. They must establish that there is essentially no evidence in the record to support 
the City's decision. They cannot do this simply by ignoring or failing to marshal the 
evidence which does, in fact, support that decision. 
The City's weighing of community interests and the general welfare against Bradleys' 
interests regarding the future development their property is exacdy the type of legislative 
process which Utah courts have historically protected and to which the legislature has 
granted considerable deference and a strong presumption of validity. The trial court 
improperly reversed the City's exercise of legislative discretion by failing to recognize the 
legitimate legislative policies, goals and objectives of this inherently political process and 
further by substituting its judgment for that of local legislators. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO BRADLEYS AND 
REVERSING THE CITY'S ZONING DECISION. 
The trial court made two reversible errors. First, it applied the 
administrative/adjudicative standards of Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 
(Utah App. 1988) requiring substantial evidence in support of the City's legislative 
decision. There is no question, based upon the long-standing, well-developed case law 
reviewed by this Court in Harmon City, that the trial court applied the incorrect standard 
of review in overturning the City's zoning decision. That, alone, is a sufficient basis for 
reversal. 
Second, the trial court then compounded the error by substituting its judgment for 
that of the local legislators in conducting what amounts to a de novo review of the rezoning 
request. This substitution of judicial judgment for the exercise of local legislative discretion 
is contrary to the separation of powers doctrine and at least 60 years of case law which has 
found such judicial interference to be inappropriate. Under well-established Utah legal 
principles, the exercise of legislative discretion in making a local zoning decision is afforded 
broad judicial deference and should be reversed by the judiciary only in the rarest of 
circumstances. Those circumstances do not apply to this case. The trial court therefore 
improperly rejected the City's legislative judgment and its decision must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court applied the incorrect standard to this statutory review of the City's 
exercise of legislative discretion in making a zoning decision, thereby undermining its 
summary judgment determination. Moreover, the record evidences that the City weighed 
the interests of Bradleys against those of the community and chose to adhere to its 
legislatively enacted General Plan. The trial court ignored that evidence and improperly 
substituted its judgment for that of the City's elected legislative body. In either case, the 
result was reversible error. This Court should therefore reverse the trial courfs grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Bradleys and direct the trial court to enter judgment in favor 
of the City. 
DATED this of June, 2000. 
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